European Critical infrastructure risk and safety management: Directive implementation in practice by Řehák, David et al.
 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING TRANSACTIONS  
 
VOL. 48, 2016 
A publication of 
 
The Italian Association 
of Chemical Engineering 
Online at www.aidic.it/cet 
Guest Editors: Eddy de Rademaeker, Peter Schmelzer
Copyright © 2016, AIDIC Servizi S.r.l., 
ISBN 978-88-95608-39-6; ISSN 2283-9216 
European Critical Infrastructure Risk and Safety 
Management: Directive Implementation in Practice 
David Rehaka, Martin Hromada*b, Petr Novotnya 
aVSB-Technical University of Ostrava, Faculty of Safety Engineering, Lumirova 13, Ostrava -Vyskovice, 700 30, 
Czech Republic 
b Tomas Bata University in Zlín, Faculty of Applied Informatics, Nad Stranemi 4511, Zlín, 760 05, Czech Republic 
hromada@fai.utb.cz 
Critical Infrastructure Protection began to be actively addressed in Europe in 2005, when the European Union 
issued a Call for a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (further only CIP) that first drew 
attention to the fact that several sectors and their elements were significant for today´s society - and that their 
failure could have serious impacts on national security, the economy, public administration and the basic vital 
functions of member states´ populations. Three years later, the EC issued European Council Directive 
2008/114/EC, which requires Member States to identify the European Critical Infrastructure Elements (further 
only CI). 
Based on the above, the paper deals with risk assessment process in context of CI protection and resilience in 
the Czech Republic. Paper presents the practical conclusions resulting from the obligations of this Directive´s 
implementation in connection with the Czech legal environment and CI. Due to the fact that the Czech 
Republic - as one of the few member states of the European Union that has identified European CI in its 
territories, discusses practical approaches to the protection and resilience of these elements. These 
approaches are addressed in relation to Risk and Safety Management from the perspective of the application 
and implementation of deliverable outputs resulting from Security Research. In this context, selected 
methodologies that optimise Risk and Safety/Security Management are also presented, which fulfil 
the requirements for CI´s crisis-preparedness plans as equivalents to an Operator Security Plan. Practical 
benefit of this paper is seen through the real implementation of public-private-partnership into the risk 
assessment process and CIP which is discussed in the following text. 
1. Introduction 
The beginnings of the establishment of CIP in the European Union date back to 2004, when the European 
Commission adopted a Communication entitled: “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against 
Terrorism” (COM, 2004). The following year, the Commission produced a Green Paper on a European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (COM, 2005), but it has been criticized extensively by Member 
States. On the basis of its critics, the material was revised and approved in 2006 by the European 
Commission as a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (COM, 2006). An important 
milestone in European CIP was 2008, when the European Council issued its Directive on the Identification and 
Designation of European Critical Infrastructures and an assessment of the need to improve their protection 
(Council Directive, 2008). In the following years, CIP issues were implemented into the national laws of 
the Member States, and then further elaborated. Attention was paid to Safety/Security and Risk Management 
with a focus on practical approaches to the protection of CIs. 
2. Critical infrastructure protection in the Czech Republic 
The CIP issues in the Czech Republic were implemented into the Crisis Management field. In response to 
the European Council Directive (Council Directive, 2008) in 2010, an amendment was made to the Crisis Act 
(Act, 2000), which thus defines the rights and duties of those authorities involved in preparing for 
emergencies, their management, and the protection of critical infrastructures. The issue of identifying CI are 
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addressed by government regulation (Government Decree 432, 2010), which sets out the criteria for 
determining the national elements of the critical infrastructure. CI protection is dealt with by government 
regulation (Government Decree 431, 2010), which sets out the requirements - and how to handle the Critical 
Infrastructure Subject Emergency Preparedness Plan. 
CIP - according to the Crisis Act (Act, 2000) refers to measures aimed at disrupting the function risk 
minimization of CIs. Responsibility for CI protection refers to a Critical Infrastructure Subject – where, to this 
end, there is a mandatory requirement to: (1) develop a Critical Infrastructure Subject Crisis Preparedness 
Plan (further only CISCPP), (2) appoint a Security Liaison employee, and (3) allow the competent ministry or 
another central right authority to carry out inspections of the CISCPP and CI protection. 
The Critical Infrastructure Subject in the preparation of a Crisis Preparedness Plan (CPP) is to be discussed 
with the relevant Ministry - or the Czech National Bank; the range of the CPP is then reprocessed with 
reference to their comments as well as the possible CI threats to the functions and measures for their 
protection. 
Another mandatory aspect of the CI is to determine the "Security Liaison Employee" (i.e. or SLO Security 
Liaison Officer) (Act, 2000), who provides for the Critical Infrastructure Subject synergies being carried out 
under the Crisis Act, and who meets the professional competence requirements by completing university 
studies in an appropriately accredited study program – providing a comprehensive knowledge of Security to 
the Czech Republic, to Public Protection or to Crisis Management – or has at least three years working 
practice in one of these areas. 
3. Methodology for selected CIs System Resilience Element Evaluation 
The methodology´s aim is to create a comprehensive assessment system using a mathematical model to 
determine the relationship and values of individual CI indicators (Hromada and Lukas, 2015). CI resilience 
reflects the extent to which a given entity is able to ensure functions in terms of external and internal factors´ 
negative effects. The aim of Resilience Self-evaluation should be to determine the CI resistance time to any 
negative factors. The resulting Resilience Parameter should be determined quantitatively. Due to 
developments in the Resilience Assessing Method concept: Qualitative Assessment of CI Resilience was 
used. Qualitative Assessment does not establish a specific time period during which the element will be able 
to resist; while, on the other hand, allowing Resilience Assessment by determining the level of its 
preparedness to ensure the given function. 
Assessment Disclosure is based on the assumption that the CI which is most threatened must take immediate 
measures to ensure its resilience through a wider range of measures. It is not just the direct threat to these 
elements by negative factors; but its Dependence Assessment also concerns other elements by means of 
a Correlation Assessment. Resilience to the so-called "Domino Effect" also plays a key role in Chain 
Character Systems. This is especially related to selected supply chain types. In the assessment process, 
the impact of the negative factor is expressed by the Risk and Dependence Impact and by the Correlation 
Coefficient. On the other hand, in terms of the Resilience Coefficient, the counterpart represents Structural 
Robustness, Security Robustness and the Preparedness Coefficient (see Eq. 1): 
( )PROCRIE CCCCfR ,,,=  (1) 
Where, RE = Critical Infrastructure Resilience; CRI = Risk Coefficient; CC = Correlation Coefficient; CRO = 
Robustness Coefficient; CP = Preparedness Coefficient. 
The Risk Coefficient – CRI; expresses the potential risk impact on CI functionality. If the potential effect is 
significant, it will be necessary to minimise this likelihood through the fulfilment of measures. 
The Correlation Coefficient – CC; expresses the assessment element function dependence on other elements:-
mainly energy supplies, raw materials, data, etc. These elements should reckon with outages and take into 
account appropriate preparedness aspects. 
The Structural Robustness Coefficient – CRO; expresses the ability to assess elements´ abilities to resist 
negative effects expressed through the Robustness Coefficient – which reflects the element´s ability to 
withstand negative effects due to their structure, system properties and the technology used. Security 
Robustness Security reflects the breadth and depth of measures ensuring security against negative effects. 
These are usually measures like: Physical, Informational, Fire, Personnel and Administrative Security, etc. 
The Preparedness Coefficient – CP; expresses an element´s capability to ensure a response to the occurrence 
of Emergency/Security incidents and to restore the desired CI functions. In case of function degradation, 
the element must have appropriate supplies to ensure its restoration. 
The CI Resilience Self-evaluation should be based on Risk Analysis and Quality Extent Assessment 
Countermeasures for “Shared Risk Effect Elimination” or, for degraded function restoration: CI Resilience. 
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The evaluation process also includes the following phases: (a) A Systems Analysis of the evaluated CI; 
(b) Analysis and Risk Assessment; (c) A Security/Safety Evaluated Areas Determination; (d) The Attributes 
and Indicators Determination Calculation; (e) The CI Resilience Calculation; and (f) A CI Resilience 
Assessment. This sequence of steps using mathematical models enables the quantitative expression of 
Resistance Parameters as well as the quantitative description of System Values Resistance. In view of 
the extensiveness of the mathematical model, we shall not go into further detail. (Hromada et al., 2014) 
The methodology presented herein, discussed the status and importance of Critical Infrastructure Resilience 
in relation to ensuring its operational continuity and – thus, the functional continuity of societies. This approach 
allows a broader perception and Critical Infrastructure Protection status within the framework of Critical 
Infrastructure Sustainability and Functionality. 
4. A methodology for ensuring the protection of CIs in the production, transmission and 
distribution of electricity 
The aim of this methodology (Deloitte Advisory, 2012) is to support the development and improvement of 
selected areas´ Critical Infrastructure Protection Management Systems. The methodology is intended for 
practical use by Critical Infrastructure Operators. The Protection Management System relates to security 
areas that reflect the Risk Analysis methodology implementation process - including the outputs and outcomes 
resulting from the pilot application and verification of the Protection Management System for a pre-selected 
location. Standards are parts of the methodology, developed and tested for: 
 Ensuring the Critical Infrastructure Physical Security System in the: Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution of Electricity 
 Ensuring Information Security in Information Systems that Support the Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution of Electricity 
 Ensuring Administrative and Personnel Safety 
 Ensuring Critical Infrastructure Crisis Management Systems 
In order to optimize the Critical Infrastructure Protection System (CIPS) development process in the selected 
area as determined by a general description of the individual development process (see Figure 1): Where: 
(1) Is a Critical Infrastructure Assets Classification and Evaluation; (2) A Threats and Risks Definition 
Catalogue; (3) An Analysis and Risk Assessment; (4) A Security Measures Determination Catalogue – 
Including categorisation and parameters; (5) A Critical Infrastructure Protection Management System 
determination of design requirements; (6) A pilot application and verification of the suggested CIP 
management system at the selected location; (7) The Pilot Application and Methodology Adjustment 
Assessment; and (8) The Critical Infrastructure Protection Management System´s documentation 
development. 
 
Figure 1: Description of the Protection Management System Development Process (Deloitte Advisory, 2012) 
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In connection with the Risk Analysis and Assessment Implementation process, the assets relating to 
a selected Critical Infrastructure area in an extension of the Crisis Law, have been defined and categorised 
(Act, 2000) and the Government Decree on Criteria for (the) Identification and Designation of Critical 
Infrastructure Elements (Government Decree 432, 2010). 
The design and optimisation of a selected Critical Infrastructure Area Protection Management System 
(CIAPMS) is conditioned by the Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment Process and the selection of 
the appropriate methodology. The following Risk Assessment Methodology is a Semi-quantitative Approach 
that works with these three risk components: (Asset, Threat, and Vulnerability); Where: 
 Asset – Is a part of the system, or its data, with relevant value for a company. 
 Threat – Any activity intentionally, or unintentionally using a vulnerability with a negative impact on 
the Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity of assets - expressed as a Threat Occurrence Probability. 
 Vulnerability – The expression of an asset´s, or group of assets´, weak points - under certain 
assumptions resulting in a threat of injury or asset loss as well as any processes/functions that 
support these assets, will be used. 
Table 1: Risk Component Assessment (Deloitte Advisory, 2012) 
Numerical value Asset value Threat level Level of vulnerability 
0 none or no unrated unlikely or unrated none or no unrated 
1 low very unlikely low 
2 insignificant unlikely insignificant 
3 middle moderately likely middle 
4 high very likely high 
5 very high highly probable or certain very high 
In order to finalise the Risk Assessment Process in relation to selected Critical Infrastructure areas; Equation 2 
was defined: 
VTAR ⋅⋅=  (2) 
Where, R = Risk Level; A = Asset Value; T = Threat Level; V = Vulnerability Level. 
After the determination of the risk components, it is possible to quantify the risk value and the resulting value 
is divided into groups reflecting the increasing level of risk. To be able to express the risk level, the following 
categories were identified: 1-40 Low Risk; 41-70 Intermediate Risk, 71-125 High Risk. 
For the next step in the risk analysis and the determination of the protection management system process, it is 
important to express the correlation between the identified risks. For this purpose, the KARS Methodology was 
used (Pacinda, 2010), which - through their correlation, enables the Risk Quantitative Analysis. 
The importance of this method is seen especially in the context of risk diversification based on the level of 
risks´ activity or passivity in relation to other risks (i.e. whether the selected risk has the potential to cause 
other risks; or whether it may be caused by other risks – the Domino Effect). The KARS implementation 
process analysis is a multi-step process where - in the first step, an inventory of risks is defined, that is to say, 
those specific for the electricity generation, transmission and distribution areas), and the Correlations 
Assessment is performed (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Correlations Assessment Table (Deloitte Advisory, 2012) 
 Index 1 2 3 
Index Risk High temperature Lightning Tree fall 
1 High temperature  1 0 
2 Lightning  0  1 
3 Tree fall 0 0  
To express the relationships between the risks, the Risk Correlation Table is filled with values where: 
1 – Is the real possibility that Risk Ri may cause Risk Rj 
0 – Expresses a condition where there is no real possibility that Risk Ri may cause Risk Rj 
 
The next step is to express the above-mentioned activity - which reflects the overall risk potential to cause 
additional risks; or whose passivity expressions indicate a number of risks which may cause the risk. 
Equations (3) and (4) are used for the calculation of the coefficients. 
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Where, KARi = the Activity Coefficient of i-th Risk; KPRi = the Passivity Coefficient of i-th Risk; ∑Ri = the Sum 
of the Risk; and x = the Total Amount of Risks. 
The last step of the analytical part of the Protection Management Systems development process is 
the Assessed Risks Prioritisation. In this step, the assessed risks are divided into the following four segments 
according to their significance: (1) Primary Significant Risks, (2) Secondary Significant Risks and (3) Tertiary 
Significant Risks. In line with the Pareto Rule (Koch, 2008), it is assumed that the first segment will have 80 % 
of the most significant risks. In this part of the process, Criteria Risk Analysis of Facilities for Electricity 
Generation and Transmission (Rehak et al., 2014) or Preferences Risk Assessment of Electric Power Critical 
Infrastructure (Rehak and Senovsky, 2014) can also be used. 
In the following part of the process, attention is paid to the Critical Infrastructure Protection Management 
System (CIPMS), which connects the various security areas into a managed deployment process that 
improves measures aimed at protecting the assets of a pre-defined Critical Infrastructure area. The CIPMS is 
designed according to the PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) continuous process. Inputs are individual requirements 
defined by the CIPMS´ areas of interest. The output is a continuous CIPMS in selected security areas or other 
areas that will be later included in the CIPMS. The individual steps of the CIPMS can be depicted as 
a continuous cycle (see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Graphical Representation of the CIPMS Continuous Cycle (Deloitte Advisory, 2012) 
Due to the different needs and conditions of individual subjects, it is necessary to clarify and consequently 
perform a differential analysis of the current and proposed states of identified safety/security areas. 
The results of the Difference Analysis are inputs for the subsequent steps of the CIPMS process. 
The activities that should be implemented step-by-step in the CIPMS process are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Setting Requirements for the CIPMS (Deloitte Advisory, 2012) 
PMS phases Description of continuous cycle 
Plan - Create The Security Manager should - in cooperation with the responsible employees, make 
regular planning for protective measures, their implementation, and regular internal and 
independent controls and other activities in the field of security. A schedule should be 
established and capacity should be allocated that will enable one to implement 
the planned activities 
Do - Implementation and 
operation 
In cooperation with System Administrators, Physical Protection Staff, the Administrator 
or Deputy of Administrative Security and other selected persons responsible for security 
should implement and operate those security measures for which these managers are 
responsible 
Check - Monitoring and 
evaluation 
Control Measures should take place – not only at the Security Events Assessment level 
in these areas, but also directly by individual measures setting controls in relation to 
their projections to their success in the prevention and detection of security incidents 
Act - Maintenance Based on the findings gained through regular monitoring and assessment of the CIPMS 
- including the consideration of the current situation in the legislative area and other 
security requirements, it will be necessary to be ready to modify the current 
requirements / update the CIPMS in all selected areas. 
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The PDCA Cycle should not be regarded only as a summary stage for all security areas´ progress during 
the selected period but - if it is possible, to also simultaneously monitor multiple cycles in different security 
areas, or even by means of individual measures, because deploying measures does not usually take place 
simultaneously for all measures in all areas, but rather - during the year, according to the needs and 
possibilities of individual entities. 
The methodology presented here is an integrated approach, in relation to the comprehensive definition and 
the structural and qualitative requirements definition of selected safety and security aspects in relation to 
the needs of the selected critical infrastructure area. 
5. Conclusions 
The Czech Republic's approach to CIP can be assessed as very active and responsible. This is evidenced 
among other things by the fact that the Czech Republic is one of the few member states of the European 
Union that has identified European CIs on its territory. Subsequently, the Czech Republic has focused its 
attentions in the Safety/Security and Risk Management areas, with relation to practical approaches to CI 
protection development. These issues were addressed - among others, by means of National Security 
Research, whose results include: (1) A methodology for selected CIs and System Resilience Evaluation 
elements; and (2) A methodology to ensure Critical Infrastructure Protection in the generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity. By applying these methodologies in practice, the Czech Republic has optimized 
its management of Safety/Security and Risks of national and European critical infrastructure elements. In 
addition, the requirements for a Critical Infrastructure Subject’s crisis preparedness are also fulfilled. 
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